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The nature of Aristotle’s topics has been a crucial issue in the Middle Ages 
(Abaelardi Dialectica, 254) and in the modern and contemporary studies on 
natural inferences (De Pater 1965; Stump 1982; 1988; Kienpointnter 1986). One 
of the crucial debates concerned their function, i.e. whether they were instru-
ments for fi nding arguments or rules on which dialectical and rhetorical infer-
ences were based (Bird 1962). The interpretation of the Aristotelian topics as 
rules of inference, defended by Abelard and Ockham (Bird 1962; Stump 1989), 
is of fundamental importance for the analysis of natural inferences and argu-
mentation studies in general, as it would lead to a more complex formalization 
based on the semantic relations between the terms of a consequence (Bird 1960). 
Inferences such as “This pen is red; therefore it is colored” cannot be consid-
ered as purely logical, in the sense of purely formalized according to the semantic 
system used in modern formal logic. Inferences of this kind hold in virtue of 
semantic relations between the terms in the antecedent and the consequent, called 
habitudo in the ancient dialectical theory (Abaelardi Dialectica, 263-264). The 
habitudo is the semantic-ontological respect under which the terms are connected 
to each other, and on which the force of the inference depends1 (Abaelardi 
Dialectica 254; Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2010: 494). In the example above, 
the passage from the quality “to be red” attributed to the subject to the different 
quality “to be colored” is grounded on a relation of semantic inclusion between 
these two predicates, i.e. a genus-species relation (Bird 1962: 309). This rela-
tionship guarantees the inference based on a rule (the maxim) that expresses a 
necessary consequence of the concept of genus itself. The genus expresses the 
generic fundamental features of a concept, answering to the question “what is 
it?”, and is attributed to all the concepts different in kind (Topics 102a 31-32). 
For this reason, it is predicated of what the species is predicated of. This rule 
1 Locum ergo generaliter defi nientes uim inferentiae dicimus (Abaelardi Dialectica, 254).
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follows directly from the type of semantic-ontological relation between the 
terms. (Abaelardi Dialectica, 315; see also Stump 1989: 36): 
Consequence If Socrates is a man, he is an animate being.
Maxim What the species is said of, the genus is said of as well.
Assumption But “man”, which is the species of “animate being” is said of 
Socrates; also therefore “animate being”, witch is clearly its genus.
Assumption 1 “Man” is a species of “animate being”.
Syllogism 1 • What the species is said of, the genus is said of as well.
• Man is species of “animate being”.
• Therefore, if man is said of anything, “animate being” is said of 
it as well.
Syllogism 2 • If “man” is said of anything, “animate being” is said of it as well.
• Socrates is a man.
• Therefore Socrates is an animate being.
Interpreted as rules of inference, the topics connect the semantic-ontological 
relations with common knowledge, or rather the shared semantic system. The 
necessity of dialectical inferences hinges crucially on the shared nature of the 
terms (Abaelardi Dialectica, 257)2. This approach can lead to a deeper recon-
struction of natural arguments combining semantics with logical rules. In order 
to show how these two interconnected dimensions can be used to analyze and 
(quasi-)formalize the structure of everyday reasoning, we will investigate the 
semantic-ontological structure of one of the more complex types of inference 
in Aristotle’s dialectical and rhetorical works, analogy. 
2 Quae quidem inferentiae, quamuis imperfectae sint quantum ad antecedentis constructionem, 
tamen necessitatem ex rerum natura saepissime tenent ueluti ista quam prius posuimus de ‘animali’ 
ad ‘animatum’, cum uidelicet natura animalis, cui animatum ut substantialis forma inest, ipsum 
animal praeter animationem existere nusquam patiatur. Perfectio itaque necessitatis etiam in his est 
inferentiis, non constructionis. Cum enim dicimus: si est animal, est animatum quantum quidem 
ad rerum naturam quam nouimus, de veritate consequentiae certi sumus, quia scilicet animal sine 
animato non posse subsistere scimus, non quidem quantum ad complexionem inferentis. Quamuis 
enim animal in se animatum contineat, nulla tamen apponitur propositio quae animal in animato 
contineri demonstret. (Abaelardi Dialectica 257). 
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1. Similarity as abstraction 
The logical structure of ἀναλογία, or rational correspondence, was developed by 
Aristotle in the Topics in close connection with the notion of similarity (homoi-
otês) and the maxims related thereto (Bartha 2010: 36). Similarity consists in 
identifying a characteristic common to distinct entities or states of affairs, which 
can be essential, i.e. semantic (Rigotti & Greco-Morasso 2006; Rigotti 2008; 
Walton & Macagno 2009), or accidental, i.e. corresponding to predicates that 
can be attributed to the head of the syntactic construction but not necessarily. 
From a logical-semantic point of view, this process of discovering a common 
semantic or accidental feature can be conceived as a kind of abstraction, resulting 
in the identifi cation of a genus, a predicate that can be attributed to different 
entities different in kind. 
In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle pointed out that analogy could be used 
for identifying a characteristic common to various entities different in a genus 
(see also Hesse 1966, Ch. 4), and for which no name exists (Posterior Analytics, 
98a20-23): 
Again, another way is excerpting in virtue of analogy; for you cannot get 
one identical thing which pounce and spine and bone should be called; 
but there will be things that follow them too, as though there were some 
single nature of this sort.
The pounce (of a cuttlefi sh), the spine (of a fi sh), and the bone (of an animal) do 
not belong to the same genus, but they can be conceived as the same because 
they share the same semantic-ontological trait, “osseous nature.” As Aristotle 
points out in the Metaphysics, analogy presupposes a difference in genus of 
the concepts that can be considered as the same from a relational point of view 
(Metaphysics 1016b31-1017a2). The spine, the bone, and the pounce do not 
belong to a known common semantic genus, as in Greek there was no word refer-
ring to a more generic predicate that indicated the characteristic of being osseous 
and being a structure. However, these concepts can be thought of as having the 
same function considering their relation with the body of the various types of 
beings. They can fall under the nameless category (Hesse 1965: 329; Hesse 
1966; Glucksberg & Keysar 1990) of “osseous nature” (Posterior Analytics 
74a8), which is functionally essential even though it has no name and is not 
part of the defi nition of the concepts (Macagno &Walton 2009). This abstract 
and unnamed predicate can be also different, depending on the respect under 
which the terms of the analogy are taken into consideration. If the fi nal cause 
instead of the material one is considered, the aforementioned concepts can be 
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considered to be “structures sustaining the body.” Analogy, in this sense, can 
be considered as an instrument for defi ning (or redefi ning) concepts by bringing 
to light some features that can be considered as essential. Clearly, the selection 
of what should count as essential and common to the terms of the comparison 
depends on how the analogy is framed, i.e. how the terms are selected and for 
what purpose. 
This treatment of similarity applies also to accidental similarities. For instance, 
if we consider the famous analogy “a sailor is to his ship, as a teacher is to his 
classes” (Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales, V, 34), we notice that a sailor and 
a teacher are essentially different, as their defi nitions are different. However, 
for the purpose of the analogy they are regarded as the same, as the analogical 
relation provides a specifi c criterion under which the terms fall (De nominum 
analogia, c. IV, 363; Indurkhya 1992: Ch. 2). This generic “concept” is abstracted 
based on their specifi c relationship, the viewpoint that constitutes the purpose 
of the comparison, and not on their absolute meaning (defi nition) (c. V, 49-504). 
In this respect, essential and accidental similarities can be thought of as char-
acterized by the same process of abstraction. However, while in the fi rst case 
the analogy selects some traits that are already part of the semantic structure of 
the terms (they are in this sense essential), in case of accidental comparisons 
the compared concepts are contextually redefi ned, and a characteristic that is 
not a component of their meaning becomes the unnamed genus. This process 
of abstraction is crucial for understanding the logic of analogical reasoning. 
2. Reasoning from a common semantic genus 
As mentioned in the above, the relations of likeness (semantic similarity) consti-
tute a genus that can be already known or unnamed. The discovery or the abstrac-
tion of a common named or unnamed genus is at the basis of the same type of 
reasoning, based on the topics that Aristotle provided in the most generic form 
as follows (Topics 114b 29-32): 
Again, look at things which are like the subject in question, and see if 
they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more than one 
object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight is to see, then 
3 In analogis vero, quoniam fundamenta analogae similitudinis diversarum rationum sunt simpliciter, 
et eiusdem secundum quid, idest secundum proportionem.
4 Unde sicut non est alia ratio quare unum proportionaliter non est unum absolute, nisi quia ista 
est eius ratio formalis; ita non est quaerenda alia ratio, cur a similibus proportionaliter non potest 
abstrahi res una; hoc enim ideo est, quia similitudo proportionalis talem in sua ratione diversitatem 
includit.
ed410408inside_E2.indb   420 13/11/14   09:22
ANALOGICAL REASONING AND SEMANTIC RULES OF INFERENCE 421
also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise also in the case of other 
things, both those which are and those which are held to be like. The 
rule in question is useful for both purposes; for if it is as stated in the 
case of some one like thing, it is so with the other like things as well, 
whereas if it is not so in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in 
the case of the others. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as 
regards a single thing and a number of things; for sometimes there is a 
discrepancy. Thus, if to know a thing is to think of it, then also to know 
many things is to be thinking of many things; whereas this is not true; 
for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them. If, 
then, the latter is not true, neither was the former that dealt with a single 
thing, viz. that to know a thing is to think of it.
These principles of inference were developed in the medieval tradition, and 
led to the generic locus5 from likeness characterized by the principle “like is 
judged by like,” specifi ed by the following maxims (Petri Hispani Summulae 
Logicales, V, 33): 
if one of [the] likes is present , the other is present as well.
if one of [the] likes is absent, the other is absent as well.
The generic maxims, provided by Aristotle in the second book of the Topics, 
were then made more specifi c in the following books of the same work, adapting 
them to two types of logic-semantic connections, the predicables genus and 
property (Topics 124a15). 
The most basic type of reasoning from likeness is based on the type of essential 
and known similarity. The two likes are known to belong to the same genus, 
and inasmuch as a predicate is attributed to the analogue, it is also attributed 
to the primary subject. For instance, a man and a dog are animals, and since 
dogs breathe (or have instincts), men will breathe (or have instincts) as well. 
However, this type of reasoning holds only for specifi c predicates: it is reason-
able to conclude that men breathe because so do dogs, but it would be incor-
rect to draw the conclusion that men have wings or four legs because birds are 
winged or dogs are four-legged. In order to understand the nature of admissible 
predicates, it is necessary to investigate the logic of analogical reasoning starting 
from its basic component, i.e. the logic of the notion of genus and the topics 
related thereto. Aristotle defi nes a genus as “what is predicated in what a thing 
5 This is the term used to depict the Greek topos.
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is of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind” (Topics 102a31-32), 
and is characterized in particular by the following topic (Topics 121a 10-14): 
Clearly, therefore, the species partake of the genera, but not the genera 
of the species; for the species admits the account of the genus, whereas 
the genus does not admit that of the species. 
The species (dog) can admit the defi nition of the genus (animate being), but 
the genus cannot be defi ned through its species. This principle was analyzed 
by Boethius and explained through the following locus: “Whatever is present 
to the genus is present to the species” (De Topicis Differentiis 1188B, 21-22)6, 
in the sense that “the essence of the genus and the accidents adhering to that 
essence are also part of the species” (De Topicis Differentiis, note 67). In this 
sense, Boethius took into account the essential predications, i.e. the predicates 
that either express a semantic feature of the genus or are related to its semantic 
characteristics. For instance, since animals breathe and have instincts inas-
much as they are animate beings, dogs and men breathe and have instincts. 
Clearly these topics concern the characteristics that the generic concept has or 
may have intensionally, and not extensionally. Aristotle developed the logic of 
genus-species relation concerning non-essential predications by setting out the 
following topics (Topics 111a17-32): 
In the present instance the demonstration proceeds from the genus and 
relates to the species; for judging is the genus of perceiving; for the man 
who perceives judges in a certain way.
Again, it may proceed from the species to the genus; for all the attributes 
that belong to the species belong to the genus as well; e.g. if there is a 
bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition; for 
disposition is the genus of knowledge. Now the former commonplace 
argument is false for purposes of establishing a view, while the second 
is true. For there is no necessity that all the attributes that belong to 
the genus should belong also to the species; for animal is winged and 
quadruped, but not so man. All the attributes, on the other hand, that 
belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus; for if 
man is good, then animal also is good. On the other hand, for purposes 
of overthrowing a view, the former argument is true while the latter 
is false; for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not 
6 In Latin: “quae generi adsunt speciei adsunt.”
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belong to the species either; whereas all those that are wanting to the 
species are not of necessity wanting to the genus. 
The genus-species inferences can be summarized in the following table: 
Principle of inference Example
Whatever is present to the genus is present 
to the species.
Animals breathe. Therefore, dogs breath.
All the attributes that belong to the species 
belong to the genus as well.
A dog is four-legged. Therefore, an animate 
being is four-legged.
All the attributes that do not belong to the 
genus do not belong to the species either.
An animate being is not bi-dimensional.
Therefore a dog is not bi-dimensional.
Table 1: Principles of inference in analogical reasoning
This logic of the genus and species can explain the nature of the fi rst kind of 
reasoning from likeness, indicating the type of predicates that can be transferred 
in the inference. In particular, in order for a predicate to be transferred from the 
species to the genus, and the genus to a different species thereof, it needs to be 
attributable to the concept itself, i.e. the intension of the predicate. 
3. Reasoning from an unnamed genus 
The second type of similarity is the ground of the type of reasoning that Aristotle 
refers to as “analogical.” Aristotle applied this type of argument to the attribu-
tion of two kinds of predicables, genus and property. 
Analogical reasoning can be used to support the attribution of a predicate as a 
genus, based on an identical genus-species relation as follows (Topics 124a16-18) 
Thus (e.g.) the relation of the pleasant to pleasure is like that of the useful 
to the good; for in each case the one produces the other. If therefore 
pleasure is essentially good, then also the pleasant will be essentially 
useful; for clearly it will be productive of good, seeing that pleasure is 
good.
The reasoning is based on a proportion, semantically conceived as a relation 
of “production”: the pleasant is related to pleasure as the useful to the good. 
This proportion, however, leads to an inference based on the logical-semantic 
topics (Macagno & Walton 2009) related to the genus-species relation. In this 
case, “to be productive of good” is regarded as the unnamed genus of “to be 
productive of pleasure”; therefore, the pleasant is a species of “to be produc-
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tive of good”, namely the useful. The reasoning is grounded on the attribution 
of the generic logic-semantic property of being “the genus of” to the unnamed 
analogical genus “to be productive of.” The proportion represents an essential 
semantic feature of the two antecedents, as in both cases the fi rst predicate is 
(essentially) productive of the second one. Since the relationship is essential in 
nature, the topic of genus-species applies, and can be represented as follows: 
Principle of inference Example
All the attributes that belong to the 
species belong to the genus as well.
What produces the good is the genus 
of what produces pleasure. Therefore, 
what produces a generic concept is 
the genus of what produces a specifi c 
concept.
Whatever is present to the genus is 
present to the species.
What produces a generic concept is 
the genus of what produces a specifi c 
concept.
Therefore, the useful is the genus of the 
pleasant.
Table 2: Structure of the reasoning from unnamed genus – genus
This type of analogical reasoning is grounded on an abstraction, resulting in 
the creation of the abstract category “to be productive of.” We can consider this 
passage as an asymmetric or vertical relation (see Hesse 1966: 59; Bartha 2010: 
43-44). This abstract concept is then used to trigger an inference aimed at attrib-
uting a predicate as a genus, and it is grounded on a horizontal relation between 
the analogical, unnamed genus and the generic predicate. In this specifi c case, 
the relation is essentially connected with the concept, as it establishes that what 
produces a generic concept is the genus of what produces a specifi c concept. 
The other type of analogical reasoning that Aristotle describes in the Topics 
concerns the attribution of a predicate as a property, which is defi ned as “some-
thing which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that 
thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it” (Topics 102a18-19). Reasoning 
from analogy can proceed from this type of predication as follows (Topics 
136b33-137a8): 
[…] inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the production of a 
house is like that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it 
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is not a property of a doctor to produce health, it will not be a property 
of a builder to produce a house. 
[…] inasmuch as the relation of a doctor towards the possession of 
ability to produce health is like that of a trainer towards the possession 
of ability to produce vigour, and it is a property of a trainer to possess 
the ability to produce vigour, it will be a property of a doctor to possess 
the ability to produce health. 
This mechanism can be compared to the aforementioned analogical reasoning 
concerning the attribution of a genus. In this excerpt, Aristotle sets out two 
proportions. The fi rst proportion can be expressed as “x produces y”, where y 
represents what characterizes the profession of x. The second proportion can be 
stated as “x has the ability to produce y”, where y represents what characterizes 
the profession of x. In both cases there is a twofold abstraction from specifi c 
cases to a generic concept and its univocally identifying feature. In this case, 
the horizontal relation between the abstract genus (profession) and the abstract 
and generic predicate (to possess the ability to produce/to produce what char-
acterizes a profession) is convertible and concerns the concepts abstracted. For 
this reason, the topic governing the passage of a predication from the genus to 
species applies (given the identity of the genus with the defi nite description). The 
reasoning that characterizes the second proportion can be represented as follows: 
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Principle of inference Example
All the attributes that belong to the 
species belong to the genus as well.
A trainer has the ability to produce 
vigor.
Therefore, to have the ability to 
produce what characterizes a profession 
is the property of the profession. 
Whatever is present to the genus is 
present to the species.
To have the ability to produce what 
characterizes a profession is the 
property of the profession. Therefore, a 
doctor has the ability to produce health.
Table 3: Structure of the reasoning from unnamed genus – property
The rules characterizing genus and species and governing analogy are different 
in the case of negative analogy. In the fi rst proportion, an analogical genus and 
a generic property (to produce what characterize the profession) are abstracted, 
but this predication is denied based on the fact that a specifi c predication is not 
the case. The logic underlying this inference is different and proceeds from a 
different topic. Its structure and rules can be represented as follows: 
Principle of inference Example
Wathever is present to the genus is 
present to the species.
To produce health is not a property of 
a doctor. Therefore, to produce what 
characterizes a profession is not a 
property of the profession.
All the attributes that do not belong to the 
genus do not belong to the species either.
To produce what characterizes a 
profession is not a property of the 
profession. Therefore, to build a house 
is not a property of a builder.
Table 4: Structure of the reasoning from unnamed genus – negative reasoning
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The dialectical treatment of analogy shows how this type of reasoning is grounded 
on a process of abstraction, consisting in fi nding a generic property common to 
the terms of the comparison (the two couples, in case of the Aristotelian analogy). 
This abstraction of a predicate attributable as a genus to the specifi c terms 
triggers the inferences constituting the genus-species relation. In particular, 
analogy can be thought of as a mechanism consisting in the generalization of 
a predication based on a specifi c case, the analogue (species-genus inference), 
followed by a predication in which the generic predication is attributed to the 
other specifi c instance, the primary subject (genus-species inference). Only 
some types of predication can be governed by the topics of genus and species. 
In particular, such rules can govern the predicates representing a characteristic 
of the abstract concept (such as in the case of the attribution of a genus), or the 
ones that are related to (motivating) its semantic features, such as in the case of 
the attribution of a property. 
Conclusion
Analogical reasoning is a complex pattern that has been investigated in the 
dialectical medieval tradition under distinct labels (see Brown 1989). Analogy 
is based on a comparison and a transfer of a predication from the analogous 
to the primary subject. These two distinct passages can be accounted for and 
related to each other from the same logic-semantic perspective that can be 
drawn from the interpretation of Aristotle’s topics as semantic-ontological 
rules of inference. The fi rst step consists in distinguishing the distinct reasoning 
processes underlying analogical reasoning, i.e. what properties or features make 
two concepts or states of affairs similar, and what rules warrant the transfer of 
the predicate from an individual concept to the other. The fi rst passage can be 
accounted for from a logical-semantic point of view as a process of abstrac-
tion of a common genus, which can correspond to the selection of an unnamed 
semantic feature common to the terms of the comparison, or the treatment of an 
accidental (non-semantic) characteristic as a pragmatically essential one. In both 
cases the process of choosing the predicate making the terms to be the same is 
guided by the analogical predicate. The process of abstracting is the basis for 
the application of the topics, or rules of inference, governing the attribution of 
the analogical predicate to the genus and to the primary subject. In this fashion, 
the transfer of the predication can be formalized and assessed according to 
specifi c semantic-ontological rules. In this sense, analogy can be thought of as 
a process of contextual defi nition or redefi nition, yielding a conclusion drawn 
from the common analogical genus according to the topical rules of inference. 
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This analysis of analogy as a twofold process of abstraction and species-genus 
inference can account for essential (i.e. intensional) and accidental similarities. 
In dialectical analogies, the ones analyzed in the Topics, the abstraction singles 
out a feature that is part of or related to the meaning of the terms and that is 
relevant under the respect imposed by the analogical predicate. This process can 
shed light on the mechanisms underlying reasoning from accidental similarity 
analyzed in the Rhetoric. 
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